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Testimony of Adam Levitin 
Associate Professor, Georgetown University Law Center 
Hearing: "Helping Families Save Their Homes: The Role of Bankruptcy Law" 
November 19, 2008 
U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary 
 
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee:  
 
I am pleased to testify in support of the Helping Families Save Their Homes in Bankruptcy 
Act, legislation proposed by Senator Durbin that would significantly help ease the 
nationwide foreclosure crisis.  
 
There are four major points I wish to make in my written testimony:  
 
1. Voluntary, private-market efforts to address the foreclosure crisis have all failed.  
 
2. Bankruptcy is the only method that can fully address the contractual and incentive 
problems created by securitization.  
 
3. Bankruptcy modification of mortgages will not result in higher mortgage interest rates or 
less credit availability.  
 
4. Bankruptcy modification of mortgages does not create moral hazard.  
 
I. VOLUNTARY PRIVATE MARKET EFFORTS TO ADDRESS THE FORECLOSURE 
CRISIS HAVE FAILED  
 
A. The Foreclosure Crisis and the Financial Crisis  
The United States is in the midst of an unprecedented home foreclosure crisis. At no time 
since the Great Depression have so many Americans been in jeopardy of losing their homes. 
Over a million homes entered foreclosure in 20071 and another one to two million are 
expected to enter foreclosure in 2008.2 We are on pace for 6.5 million homes, or 12.7% of 
all residential borrowers, to be in foreclosure by 2012.3 Nearly a quarter of a million homes 
were actually sold in foreclosure or otherwise surrendered to lenders in 2007.4 At the end of 
the first quarter of 2008, one in eleven homeowners was either past due or in foreclosure, 
the highest levels on record.5 Already nearly 20% of homeowners have negative equity in 
their homes,6 and by the time the housing market stabilizes, 40% of homeowners will have 
negative equity positions.7  
 
The sheer number of foreclosures should be alarming because foreclosures create significant 
deadweight loss.9 Historically, lenders are estimated to lose 40% - 50% of their investment 
in a foreclosure situation, 10 and in the current market, even greater losses are expected. II 
Borrowers lose their homes and are forced to relocate, often to new communities. 
Foreclosure is an undesirable outcome for borrowers and lenders.  
 
Foreclosures also have major third-party externalities. When families have to move to new 
homes, community ties are rent asunder. Friendships, religious congregations, schooling, 
childcare, medical care, transportation, and even employment often depend on geography. 
12 Homes root people in strong networks of community ties, and foreclosures destroy these 
key social bonds.  
 
Foreclosures also depress housing and commercial real estate prices throughout entire 
neighborhoods. There is, on average, a $3,000 property value decline for each of the closest 
fifty neighbors of a foreclosed property. 13 The property value declines caused by 
foreclosure hurt local businesses and erode state and local government tax bases. 14 
Condominium and homeowner associations likewise find their assessment base reduced by 
foreclosures, leaving the remaining homeowners with higher assessments. 15  
 
Foreclosed properties also impose significant direct costs on local governments and foster 
crime.16 A single foreclosure can cost the city of Chicago over $30,000.17 Moreover, 
foreclosures have a racially disparate imrsact because African-Americans invest a higher 
share of their wealth in their homes 8 and are also more likely than financially similar 
whites to have subprime loans. 19  
The foreclosure crisis has also been at the root of a larger financial crisis.  
 
Because most residential mortgages are securitized into widely held securities, 
unprecedented default rates in the residential mortgage market affect not just mortgage 
lenders, but capital markets globally. The marketwide impact of defaults on mortgage-
backed securities have been amplified by poorly understood and complex derivative  
 
products that are bought and sold by financial institutions, which now find themselves 
insufficiently liquid or undercapitalized. This in turn has led to a global credit crisis as 
financial institutions have become hesitant to contract not knowing their counterparties' 
ultimate solvency.  
 
As long as foreclosures continue at unabated rates, mortgage defaults will continue to rise as 
foreclosures depress real estate prices, fueling the cycle. Until housing prices stabilize, we 
will not see stability in the financial system, and housing prices cannot stabilize unless the 
tide of foreclosures is stemmed. In short, foreclosure is an inefficient outcome that is bad 
not only for lenders and borrowers, but for society at large.  
 
B. Loss Mitigation Options on Defaulted Loans  
 
Foreclosure, of course, is never mandatory, It is only one possibility among a set of loss 
mitigation options for a lender confronted with a defaulted loan. A lender always has the 
option of forbearing or of modifying the terms of a non-performing loan so that it can 
perform under less onerous terms. 20 Indeed, so long as the losses from a modification 
would be less than those from foreclosure, modification is the efficient economic outcome 
for a non-performing loan. Given the sizeable losses lenders incur in foreclosure, one would 
expect lenders to be making significant modifications to loans, including reduction of 
principal and interest.  
 
Chart 2: Loan Modifications, Repayment Plans, and Foreclosures, HOPE Now Alliance 
Members, Third Quarter 2007-Second Quarter 2008. 21  
 
Yet, to date, there have been relatively few voluntary, private modifications of non-
performing loans. As Chart 2 shows, the workouts performed by the HOPE Now Alliance 
have failed to keep pace with foreclosures. Chart 3 presents a similar picture for all national 
banks and federal thrifts. Moreover, as both Charts 2 and 3 show, most of the workouts have 
been repayment plans, in which the arrearage is simply reamortized into the remaining term 
of the loan or tacked on at the end, thereby increasing or at best holding steady the 
borrower's monthly payments. While repayment plans are sensible solutions to temporary 
disruptions in the borrower's cash flow, they are wholly inadequate responses to the key 
problems of the current mortgage market-payment reset shock and negative equity. Payment 
reset shock from an adjustable rate mortgage or negative amortization trigger in an option-
ARM can only be addressed by modifications that freeze or lower monthly payments, which 
requires a reduction in the interest rate or principal of the loan. Likewise, negative equity 
positions can only be corrected through principal write-downs.  
 
Even among the modifications, the vast majority have failed to reduce monthly payments, 
making them near worthless.23 As the State Foreclosure Prevention Working  
 
Group has noted, one out of five loan modifications made in the past year are currently 
delinquent. The high number of previously-modified loans currently delinquent indicates 
that significant numbers of modifications offered to homeowners have not been sustainable 
.... [M]any loan modifications are not providing any monthly payment relief to struggling 
homeowners . . . . [U]nrealistic or "band-aid" modifications have only exacerbated and 
prolonged the current foreclosure crisis.24  
 
Unrealistic modifications have been a problem not just for the subprime loans examined by 
the State Foreclosure Prevention Working Group, but also for the predominantly non-
subprime loans held in Fannie Mae's portfolio or securitized by Fannie Mae, the vast 
majority of loan workouts have been through Fannie's "HomeSaver Loan" program, which 
involves making defaulted homeowners a new unsecured loan for up to $15,000 to cover the 
deficiency on their mortgage loan. The HomeSaver program thus increases financially 
distressed homeowners' debt burdens while masking non¬performing loans. At best, 
HomeSaver is a bridge-loan program that buys time until a  
. modification can be done, but given that Fannie Mae is carrying the HomeSaver Loans on 
its books at about 2% of their face value/5 it clearly expects near universal default arid no 
recovery on these loans.  
 
The federal government's foreclosure prevention programs have even more dismal results. 
The FHA's FHASecure program, which was intended to let borrowers with non-FHA 
adjustable rate and interest-only mortgages refinance into fixed-rate FHA loans has only 
helped a few thousand borrowers,26 instead of the predicted 240,000.27 FHA's Hope for 
Homeowners program, enacted in July 2008, as part of the Housing and Economic 
Recovery Act of 2008, has also been an absolute failure. Predicted to help 400,000 
homeowners,28 it has, to date, helped only around 100 homeowners29 in large part because 
the cooperation needed from private lenders and servicers for homeowners to enter the 
program has been lacking. As the State Foreclosure Prevention Working Group has noted, "[ 
n ] early eight out of ten seriously delinquent homeowners are not on track for any loss 
mitigation outcome," and "[n]ew efforts to prevent foreclosures are on the decline, des~ite a 
temporary increase in loan modifications through the [second quarter] of2008. 0  
 
II. BANKRUPTCY MODIFICATION Is THE ONLY WAY TO ADDRESS THE 
OBSTACLES TO MORTGAGE MODIFICATION CREATED BY SECURITIZATION  
 
A major factor complicating private, voluntary loan modification efforts is securitization. 
The vast majority, somewhere upwards of 80%, of residential mortgages are securitized. 
Understanding securitization is key to understanding why private,voluntary efforts at 
mortgage modification will inevitably fail and why bankruptcy modification presents the 
only sure method of preventing preventable foreclosures.  
 
Securitization transactions are technical, complex deals, but the core of the transaction is 
fairly simple. A financial institution owns a pool of mortgage loans, which it either made 
itself or purchased. Rather than hold these mortgage loans (and the credit risk) on its own 
books, it sells them to a specially created entity, typically a trust (SPY). The trust pays for 
the mortgage loans by issuing bonds. The bonds are collateralized (backed) by the loans 
now owned by the trust. These bonds are so-called mortgage¬backed securities (MBS).  
 
Because the trust is just a shell to hold the loans and put them beyond the reach of the 
financial institution's creditors, a third-party must be brought in to manage the loans. This 
third-party is called a servicer. The servicer is supposed to manage the loans for the benefit 
of the MBS holders. The servicer performs the day-to-day tasks related to the mortgages 
owned by the SPY, such as collecting payments, handling paperwork, foreclosing, and 
selling foreclosed properties. These servicers are the entities that actually consider loan 
modification requests. Confusingly, the servicer is often, but not always, a corporate affiliate 
of originator; most of the major servicers are subsidiaries of bank holding companies: 
Countrywide Home Loans (Bank of America); CitiMortgage and CitiFinancial (Citigroup); 
Select Portfolio Servicing (Credit Suisse); Litton Loan Servicing LP (Goldman Sachs); 
Chase Home Finance and EMC Mortgage (JPMorgan Chase); Wilshire Credit (Merrill 
Lynch); Wells Fargo Home Mortgage and Homeq Servicing (Wells Fargo).  
 
Securitization creates numerous obstacles to voluntary loan modifications, but they may be 
reduced to three broad categories: contractual, practical, and economic.31 A.  
 
Securitization Creates Contractual Limitations on Private Mortgage Modification  
 
Securitization creates contractual limitations on private mortgage modification.  
 
These limitations cannot be bypassed except through bankruptcy modification or a taking 
ofMBS holders' property rights.  
 
Servicers carry out their duties according to what is specified in their contract with the SPY. 
This contract is known as a "pooling and servicing agreement" or PSA. Although the 
decision to modify mortgages held by an Spy rests with the servicer, and servicers are 
instructed to manage loans as if for their own account, PSAs often place restrictions on 
servicers' ability to modify mortgages. Almost all PSAs restrict modifications to loans that 
are in default or where default is imminent or reasonably foreseeable in order to protect the 
SPY's pass-thru REMIC tax and off-balance sheet accounting status. 32  
 
PSAs often further restrict modifications: sometimes the modification is forbidden outright, 
sometimes only certain types of modifications are permitted, and sometimes the total 
number of loans that can be modified is capped (typically at 5% of the pool). Additionally, 
servicers are frequently required to purchase any loans they modify at the face value 
outstanding (or even with a premium). This functions as an anti¬modification provision.  
 
No one has a firm sense of the frequency of contractual limitations to modification for 
residential MBS (RMBS). A small and unrepresentative sampling by Credit Suisse indicates 
that almost 40% of RMBS PSAs have limitations on loan modification beyond a near 
universal requirement that the a loan be in default or imminently defaulting before it may be 
modified.33 The Credit Suisse study, however, did not track all types of modification 
restrictions, such as face-value repurchase provisions, so the true number of restrictive PSAs 
is likely higher. Nonetheless, there are still a large number of homeowners whose mortgages 
are held by securitization trusts with restrictive PSAs. This includes both private-label 
securitizations and GSE securitizations; some Fannie Mae securitizations, for example, 
prohibit any reductions in either principal or interest rates.34  
 
It is virtually impossible to change the terms of a restrictive PSA in order to allow the 
servicer greater freedom to engage in modifications. The PSA is part of the indenture under 
which the MBS are issued. Under the Trust Indenture Act of 1939,35 the consent of 100% 
of the MBS holders is needed in order to alter the PSA in a manner that would affects the 
MBS' cashflow, as any change to the PSA's modification rules would.  
 
Practically speaking, it is impossible to gather up 100% of any MBS issue. There can be 
thousands of MBS certificates from a single pool and these certificate holders might be 
dispersed world-wide. The problem is exacerbated by collateralized mortgage obligations 
(CMOs), second mortgages, and mortgage insurance. MBS issued by an Spy are typically 
tranched-divided into different payment priority tiers, each of which will have a different 
dividend rate and a different credit rating. Because the riskier tranches are not investment 
grade, they cannot be sold to entities like pension plans and mutual funds. Therefore, they 
are often resecuritized into what are known as CMOs. A CMO is a securitization in which 
the assets backing the securities are themselves mortgage¬backed securities rather than the 
underlying mortgages. CMOs are themselves then tranched, and the senior tranches can 
receive investment grade ratings, making it possible to sell them to major institutional 
investors. The non-investment grade components of CMOs can themselves be resecuritized 
once again into what are known as CM02s. This process can be repeated, of course, an 
endless number of times.  
 
The upshot of this financial alchemy is that to control 100% of an MBS issuance in order to 
alter a PSA, one would also have to own 100% of multiple CMOs to alter the  
CMOs' PSAs and of multiple CM02s to alter the CM02s' PSAs. .  
 
The impossibility of modifying PSAs to permit modification on a wide scale is further 
complicated because many homeowners have more than one mortgage. Even if the 
mortgages are from the same lender, they are often securitized separately. If a homeowner is 
in default on two or three mortgages it is not enough to reassemble the MBS pieces to 
permit a modification of one of the mortgages. Modification of the senior mortgage alone 
only helps the junior mortgage holders, not the homeowner. In order for a loan modification 
to be effective for the first mortgage, it is necessary to also modify the junior mortgages, 
which means going through the same process. This process is complicated because senior 
lenders frequently do not know about the existence of the junior lien on the property. ]  
 
A further complication comes from insurance. An SPV's income can exceed the coupons it 
must pay certificate holders. The residual value of the SPY after the certificate holders are 
paid is called the Net Interest Margin (NIM). The NIM is typically resecuritized separately 
into an NIM security (NIMS), and the NIMS is insured by a financial institution. This NIMS 
insurer holds a position similar to an equity holder for the SPY. The NIMS insurer's consent 
is thus typically required both for modifications to PSAs and modifications to the 
underlying mortgages beyond limited thresholds. NIMS insurers' financial positions are very 
similar to out-of-the-money junior mortgagees¬they are unlikely to cooperate absent a 
payout because they have nothing to lose.  
 
Thus, the contractual structure of securitization creates insurmountable obstacles to 
voluntary, private modifications of distressed and defaulted mortgages, even if that would 
be the most efficient outcome.  
 
B. Practical Obstacles to Voluntary Modification  
There are a range of practical difficulties that impede voluntary modification programs. 
Servicers lack sufficient personnel to handle a large volume of customer contacts. Servicers 
lack the trained loan officers necessary to handle the volume of requested modifications, 
which are essentially the underwriting of a new loan. Servicers often have trouble contacting 
financially distressed borrowers. And the computer software that servicers use to do their 
net present value calculations to compare returns from foreclosure or successful 
modifications may use obsolete inputs, such as assuming that housing prices are rising, 
which will lead servicers to wrongly believe that foreclosure is the best loss mitigation 
outcome.  
 
C. Economic Disincentives for Servicers to Engage in Voluntary Modifications  
 
Securitization also creates seri'ous incentive misalignment problems that can lead to 
inefficient foreclosures. Mortgage servicer compensation structures create a situation in 
which foreclosure is often more profitable to servicers than loan modification. Therefore 
servicers are incentivized to foreclose rather than modify loans, even if modification is in 
the best interest of the MBS holders and the homeowners. 36  
 
Servicers receive three main types of compensation: a servicing fee, which is a percentage 
of the outstanding balance of the securitized mortgage pool; float income from investing 
homeowners mortgage payments in the period between when the payments are received and 
when the are remitted to the trust; and ancillary fees. When a loan performs, the servicer has 
largely fixed-rate compensation. This is true also when a loan performs following a 
modification.  
 
Thus, if a servicer modifies a loan in a way that reduces monthly payments, the servicer will 
have a, reduced income stream itself. This reduced income stream will only last as long as 
the loan is in the servicing portfolio. If the loan is refinanced or redefaults, it will leave the 
portfolio. Generally servicers do not expect loans to remain in their portfolios for very long. 
For example, a 2/28 ARM is likely to be refinanced by year three, when the teaser rate 
expires, and move to another servicer's portfolio. Moreover, for non-GSE RMBS, servicers 
are not compensated for the sizeable costs of loan modification.  
 
Thus, when a servicer modifies a loan, the servicer loses servicing and float income (which 
it will not have long into the future anyhow) and incurs expenses.  
 
When a servicer forecloses, servicer compensation shifts to a cost-plus basis. The servicer 
does not receive any additional servicing fee or float revenue from the loan, but does receive 
all expenses of the foreclosure, including any fees it tacks on, such as collateral inspection 
fees, and process serving fees, etc. These fees are paid off the top from foreclosure 
recoveries, so it is the MBS holders, not the servicer, that incur the loss in foreclosure.37 
The fees servicers can lard on in forecl6sure can be considerable, and there is effectively no 
oversight of their reasonableness or even authorization. 38 MBS holders lack the ability to 
monitor servicer decisions, and securitization trustees do not have the responsibility to do 
so. Servicers are essentially able to receive cost-plus-percentage-of-cost compensation when 
foreclosing. The incentive misalignments from this form of compensation are so severe that 
it is flatly prohibited for federal government contracts. 39  
 
The choice between modification and foreclosure is a choice between limited fixed-price 
income and a cost-plus contract arrangement with no oversight of either the costs or the plus 
components. For mortgage servicers, this creates a very strong incentive to foreclose on 
defaulted loans rather than modify them, even if modification is in the best interest of the 
MBS holders.4o The principal-agent conflict between RMBS holders and mortgage 
servicers is a major factor inhibiting voluntary loan modifications.  
 
III. PERMITTING MODIFICATION OF ALL MORTGAGES IN BANKRUPTCY WILL 
NOT RESULT IN HIGHER MORTGAGE RATES OR LESS CREDIT AVAILABILITY  
 
Traditionally, bankruptcy is one of the major mechanisms for resolving financing distress. 
Bankruptcy creates a legal process through which the market can work out the problems 
created when parties end up with unmanageable debt burdens. Although the process can be 
a painful one for all parties involved, bankruptcy allows an orderly forum for creditors to 
sort out their share of losses and return the deleveraged debtor to productivity; a debtor 
hopelessly mired in debt has little incentive to be economically productive because all of the 
gain will go to creditors. Moreover, the existence of the bankruptcy system provides a 
baseline against which consensual debt restructurings can occur. Thus, for over a century 
bankruptcy has been the social safety net for the middle class, joined later by Social Security 
and unemployment benefits.  
 
The bankruptcy system, however, is incapable of handling the current home foreclosure 
crisis because of the special protection it gives to most residential mortgage claims. Debtors 
may generally modify all types of debts in bankruptcy-reducing interest rates, stretching out 
loan tenors, changing amortization schedules, and limiting secured claims to the value of 
collateral ("strip down" or "cram down"). Under current law, debtors can modify mortgages 
on vacation homes, investor properties, and multifamily residences in which the owner 
occupies a unit. 41 Debtors can also currently modify wholly unsecured second mortgages 
on their principal residences,42 as well as loans secured by yachts, jewelry, household 
appliances, furniture, vehicles, or any other type of personalty. 43  
 
The Bankruptcy Code, however, forbids the modification of mortgage loans secured solely 
by the debtor's principal residence.44 Single-family owner-occupied property mortgage 
loans must be cured and then paid off according to their original terms, including all fees 
that have been levied since default, or else the bankruptcy automatic stay will be lifted, 
permitting the mortgagee to foreclose on the property. As a result, if a debtor's financial 
distress stems from an unaffordable home mortgage, bankruptcy is unable to help the debtor 
retain her hoine, and foreclosure will occur.  
 
The Bankruptcy Code's special protection for home mortgage lenders reflects an economic 
assumption that preventing modification of home mortgage loans in bankruptcy limits 
lenders' losses and thereby encourages greater mortgage credit availability and lower 
mortgage credit costs, which in turn encourage homeownership.45 Underlying the economic 
assumption embedded in the Bankruptcy Code's anti¬modification provision is another 
assumption-that mortgage markets are sensitive to bankruptcy modification risk. All 
existing empirical evidence, however, indicates that these assumptions are incorrect. 
Mortgage markets are indifferent to bankruptcy modification risk. 46  
 
A. All Empirical Evidence Indicates that Mortgage Markets Are Indifferent to Bankruptcy 
Modification Except at Margins  
 
There is a simple way to test for market sensitivity to bankruptcy modification: compare 
mortgage interest and insurance rates on property types for which the mortgages may 
currently be modified in bankruptcy with the rates on properties on which the mortgages 
may not be modified in bankruptcy. Courts have interpreted the Bankruptcy Code's 
mortgage anti-modification provision to apply only to single-family principal residence 
mortgages.47 Thus, single-family principal residence mortgages may not be modified in 
bankruptcy; all other mortgages may be modified in bankruptcy. One would expect that if 
the market were sensitive to bankruptcy modification, there would be a risk premium for 
mortgages on the types of property that can currently be modified in bankruptcy-mortgages 
on vacation homes, multifamily homes, and investment properties-and that this premium 
would not exist for single-family owner-occupied principal residence mortgages, which 
cannot be modified.  
 
In an article forthcoming in the Wisconsin Law Review,48 I tested this hypothesis using 
three different pricing measures in mortgage markets: effective mortgage interest rates 
(annual percentage rates or APRs), private mortgage insurance rates, and secondary 
mortgage market pricing from Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. In each market I examined rate 
variation by property type in order to isolate the expected risk premium for bankruptcy 
modification risk on non-single-family owner-occupied properties. All three measures 
indicate that mortgage markets are indifferen~ to bankruptcy modification risk, at least in 
terms of pricing; 49 the variation in rates in each market does not track with bankruptcy 
modification risk.  
 
In a companion article-in-progress, coauthored with Joshua Goodman of Columbia 
University, I test the impact of permitting cramdown historically in the period before 1993, 
when it was permitted in many judicial districts. This historical evidence shows scant 
evidence of market sensitivity. Historically, in a very different mortgage market, we only 
detect a 12 basis point average impact on interest rates from cramdown, and no impact on 
credit availability. Current market data, however, suggest no impact whatsoever from any 
ability to modify mortgages in bankruptcy. Taken together, the evidence in these articles 
suggests that permitting modification of mortgages in bankruptcy would have no overall 
impact on mortgage costs or availability, except at the margins. Marginal, high-risk 
borrowers might find credit slightly more expensive, but all available evidence indicates that 
there will be no impact on creditworthy borrowers.  
 
These empirical finding comport with economic theory. If foreclosure losses are greater than 
bankruptcy modification losses, the market will not price against bankruptcy modification. 
Evidence from a variety of historical and contemporary sources indicates that lenders' losses 
from bankruptcy modification would be less than from foreclosure. Indeed, by definition a 
lender cannot do worse in bankruptcy than in foreclosure; bankruptcy law provides that a 
secured lender must receive at least what the lender would receive in foreclosure, namely 
the value of the collateral. 50  
 
B. The Mortgage Bankers Association's Claim Regarding the Impact of Bankruptcy 
Modification Is Patently False and Disprovable  
 
The Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA) has claimed that permitting modification of 
mortgages in bankruptcy will result in an effective 200 basis point increase in interest rates 
on single-family owner-occupied properties ("principal residences,,).51 The MBA figure has 
varied over the course of the MBA's lobbying effort against bankruptcy reform, shrinking by 
a quarter to 150 basis points in more recent lobbying materials. The MBA's methodology for 
calculating the figure has also changed. 52 Regardless of size or calculation, the MBA 
figure is patently false and is the result of a cherry-picked comparison.  
 
The MBA figure is derived from a comparison of the current interest rate spread between 
mortgages on single-family principal residences and on investor properties. 53 The MBA 
reasons that because single-family principal residence mortgages cannot be modified in 
bankruptcy while investor property mortgages can, then the entire difference in mortgage 
prices for these property types is attributable to bankruptcy modification risk for the investor 
properties.  
 
The MBA's claim is demonstrably false. First, the MBA engages in questionable 
calculations of the price spread. It includes not only the current additional interest rate 
premium for investor properties of 37.5 basis points, but also amortizes the higher down 
payments and points generally required on investor properties in order to achieve the 200 (or 
150) basis point figure. 54  
 
Even accepting the MBA's inflated numbers, however, the idea that the entire spread in 
mortgage rates between single-family owner-occupied prorerties and investor properties 
being due to bankruptcy modification risk is preposterous. 5  
 
The MBA then cherry-picks its evidence to support its lobbying position. The MBA could 
have also compared interest rates spreads between mortgages on single¬family owner 
occupied properties and mortgages on other property types that can currently be modified in 
bankruptcy-mortgages on multifamily properties or vacation homes. As it turns out, there is 
no rate spread; conforming mortgages on vacation homes and multifamily properties are 
currently priced the same as single-family principal residences. Only investor property 
mortgages are priced higher. The same holds true for private mortgage insurance premiums; 
there is no additional premium for multifamily properties at any of the seven major private 
mortgage insurers, even though multifamily property mortgages can be modified in 
bankruptcy. The pattern also holds true for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac delivery fees-
Fannie and Freddie do not demand discounts that track the difference in bankruptcy 
modification risk. This means higher interest rates on investor properties must be attributed 
to non-bankruptcy risk factors entailed in lending against an investor property.  
 
There are many non-bankruptcy risk factors that explain the pricing spread on mortgages 
between investment properties and single-family owner occupied properties.  
 
The higher interest rates and points required on investor properties are explained by higher 
default rates on investor properties, the greater likelihood of investor properties being non-
recourse, and the more limited secondary market for investor property mortgages. Investor 
properties have inherently greater default risk in part because an investor has the additional 
rent or mortgage expense that an owner-occupier does not. Investor properties also carry a 
variety of tenant risks-vacancy, nonpayment, and damage. Because investor properties 
mortgages are often financed through rental payments, tenant risk adds to the default risk. 
There are myriad risk factors for investor properties that single-family owner-occupied 
properties do not have. The MBA, of all organizations, should recognize that most, if not all, 
of the price spread between investor property mortgages and single-family owner-occupied 
mortgages is due to factors other than bankruptcy modification risk. Yet the MBA contends 
that the entire price-spread is due to differences in bankruptcy modification risk. If the MBA 
revealed a non-cherry¬picked comparison in its lobbying materials, its spurious 150 or 200 
basis point claim would fall apart.  
 
Based on my empirical analysis of a wide variety of mortgage market data, 56 there IS 
statistically a zero percent chance that the MBA's 150 or 200 basis point claim is correct. All 
empirical and market observational data indicates that that MBA's claim of an effective 150-
200 basis point increase from allowing strip-down is simply groundless. At best the MBA's 
figure is a wild and irresponsible guess; at worse it is a deliberately concocted falsehood.  
 
Contrary to the MBA's spurious claims, all empirical evidence indicates that there is 
unlikely to be anything more than a de minimis effect on interest rates as a result of 
permitting bankruptcy modification.  
 
IV. BANKRUPTCY MODIFICATION DOES NOT CREATE A MORAL HAZARD  
 
One of the major objections voiced against permitting modification of mortgages in Chapter 
13 bankruptcy is that it will create a moral hazard and that consumers will be tempted to go 
out and gamble on unaffordable loans because they can always discharge their debt in 
bankruptcy. This view reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of the bankruptcy process 
and of the problem created by foreclosures.  
 
A. Bankruptcy Imposes Significant Costs on Debtors  
 
Permitting modification of mortgages in Chapter 13 bankruptcies will not create a moral 
hazard problem. Chapter 13 is not a "drive-by" process. In order to receive a discharge in 
Chapter 13, a debtor must live on a court-supervised means-tested budget for 3 or 5 years. 
57 Having to get the court and the United States Trustee to sign off on the reasonableness of 
daily expenses creates a powerful disincentive against filing for bankruptcy unless the filing 
is absolutely necessary. Moreover, Chapter 13 insists on full repayment of certain debts, 
including allowed secured claims, domestic support obligations, and tax liabilities. 58 A 
below-median-income debtor who does not repay creditors in full can only receive a 
Chapter 13 discharge once every six years; an above-median-income debtor who does not 
repay creditors in full can only receive a Chapter 13 discharge once every ten years. 59 This 
means that the minimum time between repeat Chapter 13 filings is longer than the time a 
foreclosure stays on a credit report.  
 
Debtors ate also unlikely to receive a windfall from Chapter 13 modification.  
Cramdown would only result in the debtor having zero equity in the property, not positive 
equity. Given the large transaction costs to a sale, debtors are unlikely to sell their properties 
for anything beyond a de minimis profit absent a remarkable recovery of the housing 
market.  
 
B. Wealthy Debtors Are Ineligible for Chapter 13 Bankruptcy  
 It is also important to recognize that permitting modification of mortgages in Chapter 13 
bankruptcy will not result in wealthy or spendthrift debtors receiving unmerited relief. For 
starters, Chapter 13 bankruptcy is not available to debtors with huge debt burdens. To file 
for Chapter 13, an individual must have less than $250,000 in noncontingent, liquidated, 
unsecured debts and less than $750,000 in noncontingent, liquidated secured debts.6o This 
means that a homeowner with a million dollar mortgage cannot avail himself of Chapter 13. 
Instead, if that homeowner wishes to keep his mansion, he must file for Chapter 11 
bankruptcy. While there is a parallel antimodification provision in Chapter 11,61 adopted 
after the Supreme Court's 1993 Nabelman (banning cram down of principal residence 
mortgages in Chapter 13) in the 1994 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, there has been 
no legislation proposed to remove it.62  
 
C. Permitting Bankruptcy Modification Would Not Benefit Speculators or Vacation Home 
Purchasers  
Bankruptcy modification would not yield a windfall to housing speculators ("flippers") or 
second home gurchasers. A mortgage loan modification in bankruptcy can occur only as 
part of a plan. 3 The automatic stay would likel~ be lifted on an investment property (or 
second home) before a plan could be confirmed. 4 Accordingly, speculators and 
homeowners intent on keeping their second homes are unlike~y to file for bankruptcy to 
seek mortgage modification in the first place. Permitting bankruptcy modification of 
primary home mortgages thus steers a true course between extending the right sort of relief 
and not extending it too broadly.  
 
D. Foreclosure Falls Within the Moral Hazard Exception for "Contagion Fires"  
 
Permitting bankruptcy modification of mortgages in order to prevent inefficient foreclosures 
also fits into a well-recognized exception to moral hazard, that for "contagion fires." It 
would create a moral hazard for the fire department to rescue people from fires caused by 
smoking in bed, yet we rescue in-bed smokers without hesitation, in part because fires can 
spread and harm third-parties, like neighbors. Foreclosures function like fires, and a rash of 
foreclosures can destroy property values throughout a neighborhood.  
 
Moral hazard concerns are inapplicable given the immense third-party costs of foreclosures, 
and the Bankruptcy Code already has powerful antidotes to moral hazard risk. Concerns 
about more than isolated serial and strategic filings are greatly overstated and unsupported 
by empirical evidence.  
 
V. POTENTIAL IMPROVEMENTS TO THE BILL  
A. Equalize Treatment of Bankruptcies and Foreclosures on Credit Reports  
The legislation could be improved by changing section 605(a)(1) of the Fair Credit 
Reporting Act,65 to provide that Title 11 case may not remain on a credit report for more 
than seven years. Currently Title 11 cases may remain on credit reports for up to ten years, 
while all other adverse reports, including foreclosures, may remain on credit reports for only 
up to seven years. The unequal weighting of bankruptcy filings and other defaults on credit 
reports creates a disincentive for bankruptcy filings and should be changed.  
 The unequal weighting of foreclosures and bankruptcies on credit reports bears no 
correlation with lenders' ultimate recovery on their loans. Nor does it provide much 
protection to potential creditors, as there is only a two-year window under which two 
Chapter 7 discharges could appear on a credit report,66 and serial bankruptcy filers will 
have sufficient other adverse entries on their credit reports to alert potential creditors of risk. 
Equalizing the treatment of bankruptcies and other defaults on credit reports would simply 
lead to bankruptcy being treated as a default on all reported debts, which is exactly what it 
is.  
 
The Bankruptcy Code already has provisions to address the potential problem of serial 
bankruptcy filers;67 credit reporting is not the place to do so. Bankruptcy is sometimes both 
the responsible, efficient, and fair course of action, and it should not be disincentivized 
relative to a non-bankruptcy default. Moreover, leaving bankruptcies on credit reports 
longer than other types of defaults interferes with the core bankruptcy policy of the fresh 
start for honest but unfortunate debtors. Bankruptcy filings should be treated like any other 
default for the purposes of credit reporting. 68  
 
Notably, when the FCRA was enacted in 1970, it provided that bankruptcy filings could 
remain on credit reports for fourteen years, while all other types of adverse entries could 
only remain on reports for seven years. When Congress passed the Bankruptcy Reform Act 
of 1978 that created the current Bankruptcy Code, the House bill included" an amendment 
by Representative McKinney of Connecticut that would have reduced the time bankruptcy 
remains on a credit report from fourteen to seven years. Representative McKinney noted 
that "an exhaustive search of the legislative history of [the fourteen year] provision has 
disclosed no compelling reason for the statute's unforgivingly lengthy memory.,,69 While 
Representative Butler noted that "The purpose of the provision was to keep the record open 
long enough so that creditors could determine whether the individual had filed more than 
one bankruptcy,,,70 this reason is simply inapplicable in the world of modem, 
instantaneous, computerized credit scoring. Indeed, even at the time, Representative Butler 
did not think it was reason enough and supported the amendment. Yet the enrolled version 
of the Bankruptcy Reform Act only reduced the time that bankruptcy remains on credit 
report from fourteen to ten years,71 in a compromise between the Senate and House.72  
 
Unfortunately, this compromise creates an imbalance in credit reporting treatment that 
favors foreclosure to bankruptcy filing. Given that bankruptcy modification of mortgages 
presents an important potential tool for helping homeowners keep their homes and 
benefiting all parties at interest-homeowners, lenders, and communities-it is important to 
amend the FCRA to provide for equal treatment of bankruptcy and foreclosure.  
 
B. Permit Mortgage Modification in Chapter 11 Bankruptcies  
 
Any changes made to section 1322(b )(2) of the Bankruptcy Code should also be made to its 
parallel Chapter 11 provision, 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(5).73 Debtors who have too much debt 
to qualify for Chapter 13 are not particularly sympathetic characters. But for inflated real 
estate markets like California, there are far from wealthy debtors who have mortgage and 
auto loan debt that exceeds $750,000, making them ineligible for Chapter 13. Making a 
parallel change in Chapter 11 would have even less impact on creditors, not just because of 
the relative rarity of individual Chapter 11 filers, but also because in Chapter 11 creditors 
have the protection of a plan vote and, for undersecured creditors, an 1111 (b) election, 
which allows them to avoid cramdown.  
 
VI. CONCLUSION  
Bankruptcy modification presents the best and most powerful solution to the foreclosure 
crisis. It presents an impressive list of features:  
 
• Immediate solution  
 
• No cost to taxpayers  
 
• Addresses both negative equity and payment reset shock  
 
• Addresses the contractual and incentive problems created by securitization; cuts servicers 
out of the modification decision  
 
• Addresses the problem of second lien mortgages  
 
• No moral hazard problem  
 
• No costs for future borrowers  
 
• Screens out speculators  
 
• Forces losses to be shared by lender and borrowers  
 
• Encourages voluntary modifications  
 
In a perfectly functioning market without agency and transaction costs, lenders would be 
engaged in large-scale modification of defaulted or distressed mortgage loans, as the lenders 
would prefer a smaller loss from modification than a larger loss from foreclosure. 
Voluntarily modification, however, has not been happening on a large scale 74 for a variety 
of reasons,75 most notably contractual impediments, agency costs, practical impediments, 
and other transaction costs.  
 
If all distressed mortgages could be modified in bankruptcy, it would provide a method for 
bypassing the various contractual, agency, and other transactional inefficiencies. Permitting 
bankruptcy modification would give homeowners the option to force a workout of the 
mortgage, subject to the limitations provided by the Bankruptcy Code. Moreover, the 
possibility of a bankruptcy modification would encourage voluntary modifications, as 
mortgage lenders would prefer to exercise more control over the shape of the modification. 
An involuntary public system of mortgage modification would actually help foster 
voluntary, private solutions to the mortgage crisis.  
 Unlike possible programs for government refinancing or guarantee of distressed mortgages, 
the bankruptcy system is immediately available to resolve the mortgage crisis. Government 
refinancing or guarantee plans would take months to implement, during which time 
foreclosures would continue. In contrast, bankruptcy courts are experienced, up-and-
running, and currently overstaffed relative to historic caseloads. Moreover, the bankruptcy 
automatic stay would immediately halt any foreclosure action in process upon a 
homeowner's filing of a bankruptcy petition.76 And, unlike government guarantees or 
refinancing, bankruptcy modification of all mortgages would not involve taxpayer dollars.  
 
Bankruptcy modification would not impose costs on future borrowers except at the very 
margins. A wide range of empirical data show that permitting bankruptcy modification of all 
mortgages would have little or no impact on mortgage credit cost or availability. Because 
lenders face smaller losses from bankruptcy modification than from foreclosure, the market 
will not price against bankruptcy modification.  
 
Bankruptcy modification would also avoid the moral hazard for lenders and borrowers of a 
bailout. Lenders would incur costs for having made poor lending decisions thru limited 
recoveries. Borrowers would face the requirement of living for three or five years on a 
court-supervised budget in which all disposable income goes to creditors, a damaged credit 
rating, and the inability to file for bankruptcy for a number of years.  
 
Bankruptcy modification also provides an excellent device for sorting out types of mortgage 
debtors. It can correct the two distinct mortgage problems in the current crisis-payment reset 
shock from resetting adjustable rate mortgages and negative equity from rapidly 
depreciating home prices-while preventing speculators and vacation home purchasers from 
enjoying the benefits of modification. And, by providing an efficient and fair system for 
restructuring debts and allocating losses, bankruptcy will help stabilize the housing market.  
 
Allowing bankruptcy to serve as a forum for distressed homeowners to restructure their 
mortgage debts is both the most moderate and the best method for resolving the foreclosure 
crisis and stabilizing mortgage markets.  
Unlike any other proposed response, bankruptcy modification offers immediate relief, 
solves the market problems created by securitization, addresses both problems of payment 
reset shock and negative equity, screens out speculators, spreads burdens between borrowers 
and lenders, and avoids both the costs and moral hazard of a government bailout.  
 
Permitting modification of all mortgages in bankruptcy would thus create a low-cost, 
effective, fair, and immediately available method for resolving much of the current 
foreclosure crisis without imposing costs taxpayers, creating a moral hazard for borrowers 
or lenders, or increasing mortgage credit costs or decreasing mortgage credit availability. As 
the foreclosure crisis deepens, bankruptcy modification presents the best and least invasive 
method of stabilizing the housing market and is a crucial step in stabilizing financial 
markets.  
 
